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The Albigensian Crusade: The Intersection of Religious and Secular
Authority (1209-1218)
Alexis Nunn
I. Introduction
In 1209, Innocent III called the Albigensian Crusade to eradicate heresy from Languedoc.
He believed the threat of heresy had become too great to handle through peaceful means. For
him and many other Catholics, the fear of heresy was very real, and he saw military intervention
as the last resort. There is no doubt that he was driven by sincere belief, but the resulting war
could not be fought according to Innocent’s vision as political concerns began to outweigh
religious concerns. The authority of the Catholic Church relied on the support of secular power,
something that was desperately needed in Languedoc, where the Church lacked not only secular
support, but where their religious authority was undermined by the growth of the Cathar
movement. Political power and religious authority were closely intertwined during this period,
but they sometimes worked at cross purposes to one another, especially in the theater of war. The
different political views between the local population and the crusaders only complicated matters
as the local population viewed the crusade as a war of aggression and territorial expansion, rather
than a just war meant to reassert Catholicism in the region. Limited military support meant that
crusaders could not afford to be lenient, and any resistance had to be punished harshly. Yet the
transgressions of the crusaders were not particularly barbaric in the framework of medieval
warfare, and both sides used violence to assert their authority.
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II. The Political Situation Before the Crusade
To understand why the Albigensian Crusade was called, it is important to understand the
political situation in Languedoc in the decades preceding the war. The region was not a unified
polity, but a collection of powerful countships which swore allegiance to several monarchs. This
allegiance was only nominal at best, and in reality, the countships exercised considerable
political autonomy. Borders were not fixed, and relied on the ability of a lord to maintain
military control. As a result, they constantly contracted and expanded with changing fortunes in
war and the formation of new alliances.1 This lack of unity is reflected in the fact that the area
had no official name, but was alternately called the ‘Albigensian region’ or the ‘Provençal lands’
by contemporaries, and either Languedoc or Occitania by modern historians.2 The area was
composed of the western regions of Aquitaine, the Pyrenees, the Massif Central, and the cities of
the central plains: Toulouse, Carcassonne, Beziers, Narbonne, Montpellier, and Nimes. Provence
is also sometimes included as part of the region as it had a similar culture, but it was not an
official target of the crusade. The Pyrenees and the Massif Central were both mountainous
regions that resisted the control of individual counts, and the central plains were cut by major
river valleys that further hindered any attempts at centralization.3
Ostensibly most of the area was part of the regnum Francorum, but the King of France
exercised minimal authority over the region, and Languedoc maintained a distinct cultural
identity from its northern neighbor.4 Furthermore, certain areas swore allegiance to other
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monarchs; Western Aquitaine belonged to the English king, Provence to the Holy Roman
Emperor, and several countships to the count-kings of Aragon-Catalonia.
By the beginning of the crusade, the count-kings of Aragon-Catalonia had greatly
expanded their power in the region by using the traditional connections between the two regions
to their advantage. The cultural ties between Catalonia and Languedoc stretched back centuries;
trade had existed from at least the time of the Romans.5 Over the course of the twelfth century,
the political power of Aragon-Catalonia expanded in Languedoc. In 1150, the Count of
Barcelona had also become the King of Aragon through marriage, giving them claims to not only
Béziers, but Provence as well.6 In 1166, the count-king Alphonse II seized Provence, and in
1179, the Trencavel viscounties switched their allegiance from the counts of Toulouse to the
count-kings of Aragon-Catalonia.7
This expansion of political power was not part of a vision of conquering Languedoc, and
they considered their Languedocian holdings as separate from Catalonia and Aragon, with no
intention of ever forming them into a single trans-Pyrenees empire. Instead, their expansion into
the region was primarily driven by a desire to check the growing authority of the Capetians.8 The
seizure of Provence and the Trencavel lands by the counts of Barcelona incited conflict with the
counts of Toulouse, vassals of the French crown. To balance this power, Alphonse II cultivated
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alliances with the Pyrenean borderlands, and his son Peter II further extended Catalonian
influence through his marriage to Maria of Montpellier in 1204.9
The English and French monarchs also sought to expand their power in the region. Both
the French and English kings tried to claim direct control of Toulouse through their marriages to
Eleanor of Aquitaine. In 1141 Louis VII of France had tried to seize Toulouse and failed. After
he repudiated Eleanor of Aquitaine, she married the English king, who also attempted to take
control of Toulouse in 1159, which the French king decided was not okay. This set off nearly
forty years of war between Toulouse, now allied with the French, and the English.10 This war
ended with the marriage of Raymond VI of Toulouse and Joan, King Richard I’s sister, a match
that potentially threatened Capetian power in the region. Although the king did not take active
measures against it, it would work to Raymond’s disadvantage during the crusade as the count
struggled to find allies and the English monarch failed to provide adequate support.11
Counts also suffered from internal threats to their authority, especially from other counts.
The counts of Toulouse were some of the most powerful and independent in the region, but the
Trencavel family checked their political ambitions. The Trencavel counts were able to gain
significant control around Béziers and Carcassonne during military conflicts between the king of
Aragon and the count of Toulouse in the mid-twelfth century, effectively cutting the Toulousain
lands in half and diminishing the power of the counts of Toulouse over the region. They
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Bisson, The Crown of Aragon, 37. William of Puylaurens, The Albigensian Crusade and its Aftermath, trans. W.A.
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remained antagonistic toward one another, despite the fact that Raymond VI was the uncle to the
young viscount Raymond-Roger Trencavel.12
Town councils also limited the political authority of counts. Society was based around
fortified towns called castra, which created a decentralized distribution of power that favored
strong town councils.13 These councils were able to use the constant warfare between the counts
and viscounts of the region to their advantage and establish de facto autonomy, which caused
serious problems during the crusade as each castra determined their support for the crusade
based on what they could gain from it.14 In the lands of the Crown of Aragon, a sense of unity
had formed around the counts of Barcelona as a response to the Muslim threat, and in France, the
Capetians had been able to greatly solidify their control through administrative restructuring and
victory in war. Their status as kings further legitimized their authority, and both Peter II of
Aragon and the Capetians actively fostered a favorable relationship with the papacy in order to
strengthen their authority over their kingdoms.15 Languedoc was secure enough from outside
threats that no sense of unification formed around Toulouse, and wars with the English, French,
and Spanish undermined Toulousain authority, allowing the Toulousain consulate to gain ever
increasing freedom from comital control beginning in 1189.16
The power struggles of the region resulted in near constant warfare over the twelfth
century. The endemic warfare of the region required the extensive use of mercenaries, much to
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the Church’s dismay. Mercenaries were a common feature of medieval warfare across Europe,
but they were perceived as a particularly bad threat in Languedoc because they posed a physical
threat to the Catholic Church at the same time that the Church felt spiritually threatened by the
growing popularity of heresy.17 Mercenaries were disliked even by the men who employed them,
but they were necessary. Mercenaries were better trained and formed more cohesive military
units, and they became increasingly common in warfare beginning in the eleventh century.
However, mercenaries’ lack of political affiliation made them a dangerous threat to the social
order, and they were universally mistrusted and disliked.18 Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay
condemned Raymond VI of Toulouse for having “a remarkable liking of mercenaries, whom he
employed to rob churches, destroy the monasteries, and whenever he could, deprive his
neighbors of their possessions.”19 While Raymond’s use of mercenaries was in no way
“remarkable,” Peter’s comment does reveal the threat mercenaries posed to church property and
the difficulty lords had in controlling them, especially if lords failed to pay their wages or
terminated their employment.20 At the Third Lateran Council in 1179, prelates condemned
mercenaries and heretics together:
The regions of Albi and Toulouse and in other places the loathsome heresy
of those whom some call the Cathars…we declare that they and their defenders
and those who receive them are under anathema… With regard to the Brabanters,
Aragonese, Navarrese, Basques, Coterelli and Triaverdini, who practice such
cruelty upon Christians that they respect neither churches nor monasteries…like
pagans destroy and lay everything waste, we likewise decree that those who hire,
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John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
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keep or support them, in the districts where they rage around, should be subject in
every way to the same sentence and penalty as the above-mentioned heretics.21

This decree opened up not just heretics and mercenaries to prosecution, but those that
employed them as well. It placed heretics, mercenaries, and their supporters outside of
Christian society, and thus judged them as legitimate targets of war.22 Pope Innocent III
used the conclusions of the Third Lateran extensively throughout the crusade to justify
the excommunication of Raymond VI.23 The papal legate Peter of Castelnau first
excommunicated Raymond for his refusal to banish mercenaries from his land, and
Innocent III reaffirmed that excommunication “for retaining men from Aragon.”24
As a result, crusaders targeted mercenaries alongside heretics. At Moissac in
1212, Count Simon de Montfort, the secular leader of the crusade, “swore by all the
saints of the Holy Land that he would not let one of them escape alive unless they handed
over the mercenaries that caused them so much trouble.”25 Despite this obvious dislike of
mercenaries, Simon de Montfort also employed them, and he sought monetary support
from the papacy in order to pay them.26 Mercenaries were a necessary evil, but the
rhetoric surrounding them was important in establishing who was and who was not a
justifiable target for violence, and at what point the use of mercenaries went from being
tolerable to untenable.27
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Third Lateran Council, Canon 27, trans. Norman P. Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, accessed at
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III. The Religious Situation Before the Crusade
Church authority was weak in Languedoc, because the church often found itself in
conflict with the local nobility, which allowed Catharism to take root and flourish. In Languedoc
it was possible for powerful men to be in charge of both the local bishopric and the secular seat
of power. The nobility also sought to take control of the most powerful bishoprics, which
resulted in large financial discrepancies and furthered conflict between interest groups.28 The
Gregorian Reform temporarily halted this development, but nobles had managed to reassert their
control over important bishoprics by the mid-twelfth century.29 More powerful clergymen had
serious disputes over the limits of Church authority and property rights, such as the dispute
between the canons of St. Anthony and Raymond-Roger, the Count of Foix. The abbot of St.
Anthony and Raymond-Roger shared the lordship of Pamiers, but Raymond-Roger consistently
flouted Church authority, even going as far as installing his wife and sister, confirmed heretics,
on Church land.30 These conflicts often turned violent. Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay accused
Raymond-Roger’s knights of having “dismembered…a priest celebrating mass.”31 During the
war, this harsh treatment of clergymen would result in Raymond-Roger’s lands being targeted by
the crusaders.
Money also turned into a major issue. Revenue and property were key causes of conflict
between the clergy and nobility.32 Many dioceses crossed political boundaries, increasing the
number of lords bishops had to reach financial agreements with, and creating conflict over the
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Michael Costen, The Cathars and The Albigensian Crusade (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 80.
Costen, The Cathars, 80.
30
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31
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Costen, The Cathars, 78-80. Strayer, The Albigensian Crusades, 6-7.
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collection of funds and tithes.33 Fulcrand, the bishop of Toulouse from 1179 to 1201, was
particularly weak, and “he could find nothing to count on by way of revenues”34 and could not
even travel around his own diocese for want of money.35 His successor suffered from similar
issues and was an active supporter of the crusade. As a result of such poor finances, bishops
tended to overtly focus on money, which attracted accusations of greed and of having too much
worldly concern from both the lay population and the papacy. Laypeople derided the
“disgraceful behavior of the clergy,”36 and Pope Innocent III felt that the clergy should focus on
spirituality, targeting specific bishops, particularly archbishop Berenguer of Narbonne (11911211) for their failure to act properly.37 Berenguer, a competent administrator, had political ties
to the Crown of Aragon, and he acted as the king’s representative in the early years of the
crusade. His career was marked by an active, political role in his diocese, something that was
common in the twelfth century as diocesan business became more complex. This administrative
role did not cohere with Innocent’s idea of what a bishop should be. For the reform-minded
Innocent, the role of a bishop was preaching and pastoral care, especially when heresy was such
a serious threat.38 If Berenguer had taken an active stance against heresy, Innocent most likely
would have ignored his more political dealings, but Innocent believed Berenguer had allowed
heresy to flourish in his diocese. Innocent disparaged him and several other Languedocian
clergymen as “dumb dogs who refuse to bark.”39
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In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, laymen expressed an increased interest in religious
reform, particularly by embracing the apostolic life.40 The apostolic life was patterned on an
ascetic lifestyle based on lives of the apostles of the New Testament. This movement was
spurred by the monastic reform of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, which saw the
establishment of new orders interested in embracing an ascetic lifestyle and rejecting more
worldly involvements.41 The twelfth century saw a rise in the desire of laypeople to get more
involved with religious life, something that Innocent III warmly embraced.42 However, in
Languedoc, where the clergy was so obviously invested in the secular world, laypeople turned to
heretics to fulfill their spiritual needs. For many people, the distinction between heretical groups
and the official church was unimportant, and they supported whomever they felt lived a moral
lifestyle.43 For example, Raymond-Roger, the count of Foix, fought bitterly with the canons of
St. Anthony, but he believed that he was a good Catholic, and he made donations to Cistercian
houses, which were actively supported by Innocent.44
Heretics appealed to Languedocian society for many reasons; Waldensians and Cathars
were both present in the region, although Catharism was considered the biggest threat.45 There
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were many similarities between Catharism and Catholicism, including penance, confirmation (or
consolamentum), and a hierarchy, but there were also important theological differences that
made Catharism appealing.46 The Cathars were called either perfecti (perfected) or believers
depending on whether or not they had received the consolamentum, or laying on of hands; only
those who had received the consolamentum became perfecti. The perfecti vowed to live an
austere lifestyle, refraining from sexual relations and meat consumption, and they dedicated their
lives to prayer and preaching.47 A believer was anyone who listened to a perfecti, irrespective of
the degree of their devotion to Cathar beliefs. Non-perfecti were not expected to follow the more
stringent guidelines, such as abstention from sexual intercourse, warfare, or the consumption of
animal products.48
Certain Cathar doctrines, particularly regarding marriage and usury, were appealing to
Languedocians. Marriage became an important sacrament between the ninth and twelfth
centuries, and the Church forbid marriages within seven degrees of consanguinity.49 This made it
incredibly difficult for the peasants of the Languedoc to find partners, and although many
ignored the decree, it caused tension between laypeople and the clergy. Although the Cathars
generally anathematized marriage, they did not try to restrict it among their believers.50 Marrying

connivance: Peter Biller, “Goodbye to Catharism?” in Cathars in Question, ed. Antonia Sennis (Melton: Boydell
and Brewer, 2016), 274-204, particularly p. 281 & 294.
46
Malcolm Barber, The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages (Harlow, England: Person
Education, 2000), 104-106. Lambert, Cathars, 73-80. Cathars believed in dual godhead; the God of the Old
Testament was evil and the God of the New Testament was good. Sin led to reincarnation, which was bad because it
kept souls tied to the corrupt world. Thus, Cathars condemned sex as the vehicle which created bodies for souls to
reincarnate into. This influenced their opinions on marriage, discussed below.
47
James Capelli, “Summa contras haereticos,” in Heresies of the High Middle Ages, trans. Walter L. Wakefield and
Austin P. Evans (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 302-306.
48
Costen, Cathars, 68.
49
Constance B. Bouchard, “Consanguinity and Noble Marriages in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries,” Speculum,
56 (1981): 268.
50
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close relatives was especially important in the Languedoc because it allowed property to remain
concentrated within the family, which was essential in a society where property was split among
all heirs, both male and female.51 Usury, too, was common practice in the urbanized environment
of Languedoc.52 Trade, including in silks, spices, and silver, formed a critical part of the
Languedoc economy.53 The extensive trade of the region made it necessary for merchants to
charge interest on loans, much to the ire of the Church.54 In 1139, the Second Lateran Council
had formalized their position on usury, and “condemned that practice accounted despicable and
blameworthy by divine and human laws.”55 While usury continued to be practiced across
Europe, Cathars believed “that usury is not forbidden,” making their religion more appealing to
the merchants, moneylenders, and nobility of the Languedoc as people did want to live moral
lives.56
Catharism was especially popular among women because it allowed them more
opportunities for religious expression than the Catholic Church. The area lacked religious houses
for women until 1206, long after Catharism had been established in the region. As a result,
orthodox avenues for female religiosity were restricted.57 As a Cathar, a woman could achieve
the rank of perfecta, a position of considerably more influence than anything she could have
gained in the Catholic Church. In fact, the number of female perfectae was nearly equal to that of
their male counterparts, something that was certainly not true for Catholic nuns and their male
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counterparts.58 Catharism allowed women to preach, although they primarily practiced their
religion within their own homes, which often acted as meeting places. They played an important
role in spreading Catharism across the region through their social networks.59
William of Tudela draws attention to the popularity of Catharism among women when he
remarked that “many fair women were thrown into the flames”60 when they were convicted of
heresy. Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay “found the women heretics even more obstinate and
determined than the men.”61 In 1206, when Diego, the bishop of Osma, and his companion
Dominic of Guzman began preaching in Languedoc, they established a religious house for
women who had converted to Catharism.62 The attraction of Catharism was also not restricted by
class. Many noblewomen were accused of being heretics, including the wife and sisters of the
count of Foix and Giraude, the dame of Lavaur.63
The Church saw the rising popularity of heresy as a very real threat not just to their
authority, but to the spiritual salvation of Christendom as a whole.64 The unity of Christendom
was a special concern for Innocent, who believed that it was necessary in order to resist the
Muslim threat in the east and to reconquer the Holy Land.65 Heresy threatened this vision, and
the very spiritual survival of Christendom. In a letter to the Archbishop of Auch in 1198,
Innocent warned that the “ministers of diabolical error are ensnaring the souls of the simple and
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ruining them.”66 He hoped to bring heretics back into the Catholic Church, so that they “may be
recalled to the Lord from the error of their ways” lest they “steal from us not temporal substance
but rather spiritual life.”67 While the threat of heresy to Church authority was troubling, it was
only a symptom of the greater problem of the danger heresy presented to the spiritual integrity of
Christendom.
That threat was amplified by the perceived expansion of heresy. Churchmen often
described heresy as a disease as a way to account for its rapid spread and to illustrate the danger
it posed to the spiritual health of the Christian population.68 The Cistercian monk Caesarius of
Heisterbach described it as a disease that had “in a short space of time infected as many as a
thousand cities, and if, it if had not been reduced by the swords of the faithful, I am sure that it
would have corrupted all of Europe.”69 The English monastic cleric Roger of Wendover also
referred to heresy as “this plague”70 and Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay called it “this detestable
plague.”71 William of Tudela “saw this lunacy spreading so much faster than before and
tightening its grip every day.”72 Heresy was a problem that threatened to spread beyond the
bounds of Languedoc and undermine the entire Catholic Church. The Church simply could not
allow it to exist.
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IV. Preaching: The Buildup to Crusade
Innocent first sent out preachers in an attempt to convert heretics or otherwise drive them
out from Languedoc. He hoped to work with local lords in this endeavor, but they remained at
best ambivalent and at worst outwardly hostile to his legates.73 Their attitude toward the legates
stemmed from the close relationship that had developed between the nobility and accused
heretics, and the tense relationship between the nobility and the prelates of the Church.
Raymond-Roger Trencavel was “certainly Catholic” but his youth and inexperience made him
“friendly with everyone,” and he employed three known heretics in his central administration.74
Raymond-Roger, the count of Foix, was related to heretics, and Raymond VI was close to
several heretics and “none of the papal legates could ever persuade him to drive [them] from his
domain.”75 From the beginning, the legates had little political support in their mission, which
hindered their ability to punish heretics who refused to repent.
Innocent’s preaching missions were based on the work of Bernard of Clairvaux, a
Cistercian who had preached in the region in the 1140s. Unfortunately, his efforts were limited
by his age and health, and he advocated for more preachers to be sent to the region. He believed
that heresy was best resolved through logic and debate, not force, but his campaign also laid the
groundwork for denying heretics their legal rights.76 Henry of Clairvaux first championed the use
of force against heretics in his missions of 1181, when he led an army into Languedoc and
captured the castle of Lavaur. However, his sojourn in Languedoc was brief, and he returned to
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Rome in 1182 to deal with Church affairs there. Nevertheless, his actions served to justify the
use of force against the internal enemies of the Church.77
In 1198 Innocent sent the legates Rainier and Guy, but they were replaced with the
Cistercians Arnold Amalric, who was the abbot of Cȋteaux, Peter of Castelnau, and Ralph of
Fontfroide in 1204. Their campaign was a complete failure. Besides the lack of political support,
the local population constantly ridiculed them. William of Tudela lamented that the more Arnold
Amalric preached, the more the people “scorned him for a fool.”78 When Arnold Amalric and
Fouquet of Marseilles travelled around the Agenais preaching against usury, the people “said
scornfully, ‘There’s that bee buzzing round again!’”79 Discouraged and beaten down, the legates
were ready to go home in 1206.80 Luckily for the preachers, the arrival of Diego, the bishop of
Osma and Dominic of Guzman brought new hope of success. Both Diego and Dominic were
intent on saving souls and reforming corrupt clergymen.81 They had not been sent to Languedoc
by the pope, but had stopped to preach on their way home from visiting the Curia. Concerned
with what they saw in Languedoc, they resolved to preach to the wayward heretics and convince
them of their errors.82 Diego reprimanded the legates for travelling in luxury and urged the
legates to instead show “humility in all their conduct; by going about on foot and without gold or
silver ornaments; and by generally imitating the way of the Apostles in all respects.” 83 After all,
heresy was appealing because the heretics followed the apostolic lifestyle, and Jordan of Saxony
remarked that this “false holiness” was “in striking contrast to the stylish and expensive carriages
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and furnishings displayed by those who had been sent.84 Diego and Dominic experienced some
success, as they managed to turn the castrum of Servian against the heretics, and they established
a religious house for reformed heretical women at Prouille.85 Both men were aware of what made
heresy attractive and they took steps to combat it, experiencing more success than the other
legates, although they, too, struggled to make any significant gains, and the preachers
experienced a significant setback in 1207 when both Diego and the legate Ralph of Fontfroide
died. In 1208, the legates were “driven to appeal to the Holy See” as they “were unable…to
extinguish the fire” of heresy.86
The final straw came one morning in January 1208 when “one of those attendants of
Satan” murdered Peter of Castelnau on the banks of the Rhône.87 Blame fell immediately on
Raymond VI of Toulouse, who had argued with Peter the night before and had refused the
legate’s request for an armed guard out of the territory. Peter had recently excommunicated
Raymond for his refusal to eject mercenaries from his lands, and the meeting had been an
attempt at reconciliation.88 Despite the allegations, Raymond did not plan the death of the legate
and it had most likely been carried out by a squire looking to gain the count’s favor. Either way,
the pope was incensed and fully blamed Raymond for the tragedy. “Forward then soldiers of
Christ! Forward, brave recruits to the Christian army!” he wrote passionately, “Let the universal
cry of grief of the Holy Church arouse you…to avenge this monstrous crime against your
God!”89
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Despite these fiery words, preaching did not end with the start of the crusade. Dominic
continued to actively preach in the region, and he developed a close relationship with the crusade
leader Simon de Montfort. In 1215 he formed the Dominican Order to carry on his preaching
mission. Together, the Order and Simon helped fulfill Innocent’s goal of using the combined
effort of the material sword and the spiritual sword to root out heresy.90 Simon also granted
Dominic Casseneuil so that he could continue his mission converting heretics. The fortress
provided Dominic a financial base, which gave him the resources he needed to weaken popular
support for heresy while Simon attacked the political structures that protected it.91 As part of
Dominic’s mission against heresy, the Order prepared its adherents for a life of preaching and
emphasized obedience, especially to the Church hierarchy, in a way that set them apart from the
monastic orders of the past. The Order synthesized canonical reform and the new lay spirituality,
and they continued to work diligently against the threat of heresy throughout the crusade.92 Their
continued efforts reflected the Church’s hope that heretics could still be reformed without
resorting to violence even as the crusaders ravished the land.
V. The Crusade: Who’s in Charge?
While the murder of Peter of Castelnau ultimately triggered the crusade, the papacy had
been moving toward a military approach for quite some time. Already in 1204, Innocent
understood the necessity of using secular authority to support religious authority. In a 1204 letter
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to Philip Augustus, the king of France, he wrote, “the secular arm may restrain those whom
ecclesiastical discipline does not recall from evil, and that spiritual vengeance may follow close
upon those who, trusting in their own ferocity, do not fear the material sword.”93 Philip Augustus
was the natural choice to support the papacy against heresy, as he was overlord of Toulouse and,
except for some marital problems, considered a loyal son of the Church.94 Unfortunately, Philip
had little interest in getting involved militarily in the region, despite repeated pleas from
Innocent up through the start of the crusade. By 1208, Philip was firmly entrenched in a war
against both England and the Holy Roman Empire, and he wrote to Innocent that “he was beset
on his flanks by two great and ravening lions, Otto, self-proclaimed Emperor and John, king of
England, who—one from each side of France—were devoting all their powers to overturning his
kingdom.”95 Philip Augustus was not sympathetic to Raymond VI, however. He accused his
vassal of working against him “by marrying the King [of England]’s sister,” and never providing
military support for the French kingdom.96 Philip refused to go himself or send his son, but he
did allow his barons to take the cross if they so desired.97
So, with no obvious secular leader, the crusade assembled in June 1209 under the papal
legates. The force was unusually large for a medieval army, although exact figures are difficult
to determine. Laurence W. Marvin gives a figure of thirty thousand, based on the armies of the
Fourth Crusade and Philip Augustus’ army.98 Crusader pilgrims, who were too poor to travel to

93

Innocent III, ad sponse sue, in Albigensian Crusade: A Sourcebook, trans. Rebecca Rist, 35.
Baldwin, Kingdom of the Franks, 513. Strayer, The Albigensian Crusades, 2-3. Jim Bradbury, Philip Augustus,
King of France 1180-1223 (London: Longman Publishing, 1998), 173-189.
95
PVC, 41-42.
96
Philip Augustus, letter to Innocent III April 1208, in Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, The History of the Albigensian
Crusade, trans. Sibly & Sibly, 305-306.
97
PVC, 42.
98
Marvin, The Occitan War, 30-33. The Fourth Crusade had involved around 33,000 men and Philip Augustus’
army may have numbered as much as 17,000 [the largest of any European power at that point]; both were very large
armies by medieval standards; the crusaders arriving for the Albigensian Crusade would not have been as financially
94

20

the Holy Land and were for the most part untrained but still wanted to earn a crusading
indulgence, made up the bulk of the army.99 Faced with an invading army, Raymond VI sought
reconciliation with the church, with involved a humiliating ceremony in which “he was led
naked the doors of the church…[and] the legate gave him absolution by scourging him.”100 After,
Raymond VI joined the crusade to protect his lands from seizure. The crusade was left without a
target, but Raymond managed to maneuver the crusade toward his enemy and nephew,
Raymond-Roger Trencavel, whose lands were rife with heresy.101
The crusaders first attacked Béziers after Raymond-Roger Trencavel’s attempts at
reconciliation were rebuffed. The viscount left for Carcassonne, leaving Béziers to defend itself.
The citizens of Béziers felt prepared for a siege and few left the city as the crusaders
approached.102 Camped before the city walls, the crusaders were pelted with abuse and arrows by
the defenders. Enraged, “the servants of the army…approached the city walls…and mounted an
attack. Astonishingly they captured the city inside an hour.”103 In the chronicles, the ensuing
events are described as a massacre. Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay claimed that “up to seven
thousand of them were killed”104 in the church of La Madeleine, and William of Tudela lamented
that the crusaders “killed everyone they could find…even priests.”105 Caesarius of Heisterbach
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claimed that Arnold Amalric ordered the death of everyone in the city, as “the Lord knows those
who are his own.”106 However, as Marvin points out, the devastation of Béziers could not have
been as bad as the chronicles made it out to be. For one, Arnold Amalric never uttered those
words, and most likely, had no idea the attack occurred until after it was over. Furthermore, the
church of La Madeleine could not possibly hold seven thousand people. Perhaps most
importantly, though, is the fact that Béziers continued to be a major population center after its
capture. This would not have been possible had the city been razed as the chroniclers claimed.
Instead, the apparent destruction of the city reflects the rapid speed at which it was taken, which
was highly unusual, and the prominent role that poor pilgrim-crusaders played in capturing the
castrum.107 What the siege of Béziers does reveal is the lack of control the legates had over the
crusaders, and the need to better control the rank and file soldiers, especially to prevent them
from looting and burning captured property.
The crusaders next targeted Carcassonne. Carcassonne fell under the lordship of Peter II
of Aragon who, as both a loyal Catholic and opponent of the crusade, hoped to mediate between
his vassal and the legates. Peter attempted to negotiate with the crusaders, but the legates would
agree to the castrum’s surrender on the grounds that only Raymond-Roger and eleven others
would be allowed to leave the city with their possessions. That, the king noted, would “happen
when donkeys fly.”108 But Peter’s willingness to support Carcassonne’s citizens only went so far.
Peter refused to offer military assistance, claiming that “there was nothing he could do for them
except pray…since I told you, I ordered you to drive out the heretics.”109 Peter left, and
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Carcassonne was placed under siege. The castrum capitulated, and Raymond-Roger was
imprisoned, where he later died.
As an interesting contrast to Béziers, all the citizens were allowed to leave the city,
including Cathar sympathizers.110 Carcassonne’s voluntary surrender and the legates’ ability to
maintain control over this siege no doubt played a role in the milder treatment of the citizens.
The legates’ firmer grasp of power is revealed by the fact that Arnold Amalric explicitly forbid
the crusaders from keeping “any of the town’s wealth,” and the crusaders listened to him.111
After Carcassonne had surrendered, the legates realized they needed a secular leader to
retain control of the territory and to thoroughly root out heresy. Legates acting as military
commanders was problematic, as it directly involved them in killing, something that most
theologians directly forbid, although some made an exception for heretics, who had willfully
abandoned the Church. In general, the clergy tried to avoid taking an active role in military
engagements during the crusade, but they did continue to lead troops on occasion.112
Furthermore, knights generally resisted overt clerical domination and would follow the orders of
a fellow knight more willingly.113 However, convincing a lord to commit themselves to an
extended campaign in a hostile region proved difficult. The leadership of the crusade and the
Trencavel lands were first offered to the Count of Saint-Pol, the Count of Nevers, and the Duke
of Burgundy. However, they all refused it as “they had plenty of land in the Kingdom of
France.”114 A more pressing reason behind their refusal was most likely the difficulty any leader
would have in subduing the region; those who already had land saw no reason to risk their lives
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for territory that had proven resistant to comital authority for generations and would most likely
be even more hostile to foreign rule.115
Finally, the legates offered the position to Simon, the fifth count of Montfort and the
titular Earl of Leicester. He was an effective bridge between the chivalric practice and
ecclesiastical ideals that the legates sought.116 While he swore allegiance to both the French and
English kings, he firmly supported the French monarchy, especially after King John of England
confiscated his English lands. His ancestors had grown increasingly close to the French king
over the last few generations, but he was at the lower end of the French nobility, with limited
landholdings and only ten vassals.117 As such, the Albigensian Crusade offered a ripe
opportunity for Simon to expand his political power. Still, he was reluctant to accept as he had
limited financial means and no promise of robust military support. In the end he accepted “on the
understanding that [the crusaders] would come to his help if summoned.”118
Of course, Simon was also chosen for his piety. He was a man “in tune with the whole
Christian world”119 and wholly committed to the idea of crusade and reform. He had abandoned
the Fourth Crusade at the command of the pope, giving up the opportunity to gain wealth and
land in the east.120 Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay emphasized Simon’s piety throughout the
crusade, noting that he would often go into churches to pray as they travelled through the
countryside or before major battles, and he also had close ties to the Cistercians.121 Throughout
the crusade he continued to give gifts to Cistercian houses in return for their spiritual support,
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and he shared his spoils of conquest most liberally with his Cistercian allies, even though he
often suffered from financial shortages.122
The choice of Simon proved problematic for Peter II. For one, the legates had put Simon
in charge of the Trencavel lands without consulting Peter, ignoring his position as overlord of
Carcassonne. For another, Simon was a loyal supporter of the French king and would most likely
pursue policies that favored the French, rather than the Aragonese, Crown.123 Peter refused to
accept the homage of Simon for Carcassonne, as he “wished to hold the city for himself.”124 An
agreement between him and Simon was bound to favor Simon more than Peter, who needed
military support for his fight against the Muslims, something Simon could not provide so long as
he was occupied with fighting heresy in Languedoc.125 However, feeling obligated to follow the
will of the pope, especially as he prepared for a holy war against the Spanish Saracens, Peter II
eventually capitulated and accepted Simon as his vassal.126
Despite this acceptance, Peter continued to try and negotiate peace between the crusaders
and his vassals. At Pamiers in 1210, Peter met with the crusaders, “hoping to arrange peace
between our Count [Simon] and the Count of Foix.”127 He also met with Arnold Amalric at
Portet.128 In early 1211, he tried to reach an agreement in which “the count [of Foix] swore to
abide by the instructions of the Church and not attack the crusaders, especially the Count de
Montfort” and Simon “would give back all the territories of the count.”129 None of these
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negotiations achieved anything “worth a trashy buckle-ring,”130 but Peter was not willing to offer
more tangible support than this before 1213. In May 1210, the knights of Montréal asked for
military assistance, but he demanded they turn over Cabaret in return, something they were
unwilling to do.131 Such an alliance would have been advantageous to both the lords of Montréal
and Peter, but the lord of Montréal may have had heretical sympathies, and thus did not want to
risk turning them over to such a staunchly Catholic lord.132 While the people of Languedoc
turned to Peter for support in general, they were still leery of outside interference in their internal
affairs.
Peter was also preparing for his campaign against the Almohads in Spain, which
necessitated a stronger position in Languedoc. As such, he sought to establish good relations
with both the crusaders and their opponents. In pursuing this aim, he negotiated marriages
between his son and Simon de Montfort’s daughter, and his sister and Raymond VII of
Toulouse.133
VI. The Crusade: Conflicts Between Secular and Religious Leaders
Simon may have been chosen as the secular leader of the crusade, but the legates continued
to play an influential role in how the crusade was conducted, and the papacy fully expected to
control the trajectory of the crusade. When Simon sought advice, he turned to a combination of
knights and bishops. At the siege of Minerve in 1210, Simon, “ever discreet and reliant on good
counsel, declared that he would take no action in regard to accepting the surrender of the castrum
unless it had the approval of the abbot, the appointed leader of the whole of Christ’s business.”134
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In 1217 at the siege of Toulouse, the legate Cardinal Bertrand offered Simon advice on how to
deal with his enemies should the city be captured, and the bishop of Toulouse offered Simon advice
and support throughout the crusade.135 Simon took this advice seriously, and the legates played a
critical role in determining how the crusade should proceed.
While Simon enjoyed a generally positive relationship with the legates and bishops on
crusade, they did not always agree completely. For the most part, these disagreements were
minor, but a major argument erupted between Simon and Arnold Amalric over the dukedom of
Narbonne. Authority over Narbonne was traditionally shared between the archbishop and
viscount of Narbonne, and both Simon and Arnold sought to expand their own authority over the
castrum by claiming the dukedom for themselves.136 Arnold claimed the dukedom through his
position as archbishop of the city, and Simon through his position as the chief crusader. In
claiming both secular and religious authority over Narbonne, Arnold was essentially working
within the same framework as local bishops who had been criticized for their more political role.
Arnold most likely avoided similar accusations because of his position as a papal legate and his
membership in the Cistercian Order.
In February 1215, Simon received the homage of the town’s viscount, further alienating
the crusader from the archbishop. At the Fourth Lateran Council, Arnold refused to support
Simon’s claims to Toulouse, and Innocent reprimanded Simon for withdrawing “the loyalty you
owe to [Arnold].”137 In March 1216, Simon toured through northern France and was formally
invested “with the duchy of Narbonne, the city of Toulouse and all those territories within his
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domains which had been won by the crusaders,”138 by Philip Augustus, despite Philip not having
the authority to invest either the dukedom of Narbonne or the territories of Toulouse that fell
under the lordship of the English crown.139 Arnold responded by excommunicating Simon,
although it ended up meaning little, especially as Arnold’s participation in the crusade greatly
diminished after the arrival of the legate Peter Benevento in 1214.140 The conflict was only
resolved in early 1217 when the new pope Honorius III reinstated Arnold as Duke of Narbonne
and called representatives of Simon and the archbishop to Rome to resolve their quarrel.141
Despite Arnold’s obvious political ambition, he and the other legates also continued to try
and convert heretics throughout the crusade, although their fear that heretics would only pretend
to be Christian to escape punishment meant they did not always accept protestations of
innocence or repentance. Consequently, they also attracted accusations of burning faithful
supporters of the church. In 1209
two heretics were brought before the Count… after taking counsel the Count
decided that they should be burnt. The second heretic—the disciple—was seized
with heartfelt grief; he began to show contrition and promised that he would
freely forswear heresy and obey the Holy Roman Church in all things. A heated
discussion arose amongst our people when they heard this; some said that now he
was prepared to do what we had told him to do, he ought not to be condemned to
die, others maintained that on the contrary he deserved death, arguing that it was
plain that he had been a heretic and the promises he was now making owed more
to his fear of impending death than to his desire to follow the Christian religion.142

Despite this fear, the legates did try to convert heretics for the most part. At Minerve in
1210, Arnold Amalric agreed to spare the lives of the citizens if “they agreed to be reconciled
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and obey the order of the Church,” and visited several houses and “tried to convert them to better
things.”143 In 1211, the bishops “with the army went in[to Les Casses] and began to preach to the
heretics in the hope of recalling them from error.”144 At Muret in 1213, even though hostilities
had already broken out between the crusaders and their opponents, the Bishop of Toulouse still
sent “a priest to urge them to turn to the Lord God even at this late stage.”145 What these
persistent efforts reveal is a continued desire by the pope and his legates to convert heretics
rather than simply kill them; the desire for reform never went away, despite the resistance and
hostility the crusaders faced.
These attempts at reconciliation did not always mesh well with the more military aspects
of the campaign. At Muret in 1213, the legates hoped to reach an agreement with Peter II of
Aragon without resorting to violence. Fed up, Simon de Montfort told the bishops that “we have
endured enough…the time has come for you to allow us to fight.”146 This exchange reveals the
influence legates still had in determining the course of the crusade, and it shows how the
religious and secular aims of the crusade did not always align. The conflicts between the legates
and Simon did not cause any rifts that threatened the overall success of the crusade, but it does
reveal how religious ideals did not always coincide with the military realities of the war and how
the ambitions of the legates came into conflict with the ambitions of Simon de Montfort.
VII. The Crusade: Conflicts Between Legates and the Pope
The legates did not always act in accord with the pope’s wishes. During the crusade,
Innocent thought strategic decisions should be a papal reserve, but such a policy was difficult to
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implement when he was so far away from the theater of war.147 Occasionally this led to
disagreements with his legates, especially as they were much less inclined to forgive men like
Raymond and take a more aggressive military role. In 1214, Innocent sent a letter to his new
legate Peter of Benevento telling him to reconcile Toulouse to the Church, as “they have
knocked on the door—and for those humbly knocking an approach to the Church is not to be
shut off.”148 While this was an honest effort on Innocent’s part to repair relations between the
Church and Toulouse, the chronicler Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay, who represented the opinion
of the legates, chose to interpret the arrival of Peter of Benevento as a diversion that allowed
Simon de Montfort and the crusaders “to cross to Quercy and the Agenais and attack their
enemies.”149
Simon de Montfort’s forays into Quercy and the Agenais were especially problematic
because they belonged to the Plantagenets and were not official targets of the crusade. While
King John did not have the best relationship with the papacy, the Plantagenets were still
considered orthodox sons of the Church, and Innocent had no desire to entirely cast them out.
However, the misuse of Church funds, religious dissent, and weak comital control flourished on
both sides of the Garonne; furthermore, Simon had no loyalty to a king who had confiscated his
lands.150 English support of the crusade was always weak as King John was under
excommunication and his lands under interdict. Some Englishmen did take the cross, but Peter of
les Vaux-de-Cernay accused them of “showing poor commitment to Christ’s work.”151 However,
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general opinion in England heavily favored the crusaders, and Peter’s complaints most likely
reflected John’s lukewarm attitude rather than the English crusaders on the ground.152
Like Peter of Aragon, John did not support heresy, and the English crown had actively
campaigned in Languedoc in the 1170s, ostensibly because it was heretical. However, Raymond
VII was the son of John’s sister Joan, and Toulouse was now seen as a potential ally rather than
the implacable enemy they had been in the twelfth century.153 In 1214, John, “who was much
disturbed that his nephew…had been dispossessed of his territories,”154 mustered an army in
Gascony. Viewed as a hostile move by the crusaders, he was still in the area after he had been
defeated by Philip Augustus at the Battle of Bouvines in July, and his continued presence was
most likely a defensive maneuver to prevent further attacks by both the French and the
crusaders.155 Despite his opposition to the crusade, John would never be an active threat in the
same way Peter of Aragon would become.
The crusade lacked a clear policy in how to deal with noble opposition to the Church.
Innocent wanted to avoid treating them too harshly as to avoid accusations of greed, and Philip
Augustus warned that Raymond’s lands could not be confiscated “until he is condemned for
heresy.”156 Innocent was more interested in reforming local lords to the Church and replacement
was a last resort.157 Such reformation efforts were essential to his dreams of establishing a
unified Christendom.158 However, in deciding how nobles should be treated, the Church
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evaluated all aspects of noble behavior toward the Church, not just their attitudes toward
heresy.159 Thus, men such as Raymond-Roger, the count of Foix, opened themselves up to
attacks by the crusaders; Raymond-Roger made donations to the Cistercian abbey of Boulbonne
and actively sought to make peace with the crusaders, which should have ensured the safety of
his lands, but his conflicts with other religious houses and his violent response to crusader
trespasses on his land served to justify the seizure of his land in the legates’ eyes.160 For the most
part, the legates were much less forgiving toward the nobility and quicker to punish their
transgressions.161 Negotiations often failed between the legates and the local nobility because the
legates expected the nobility to fulfill harsh penalties, no matter how impractical. In 1211, the
legates demanded that Raymond VI
“must dismiss the mercenaries that same night or next morning; must
restore their rights to the clergy, who should be supreme in everything…the count
must expel all faithless Jews…[and] hand over to the abbot and his advisers all
the heretical believers…nor in future should they wear clothes made of rich
fabrics but only coarse brown capes…they must dismantle their castles and
strongholds. No knight must reside in a town but out in the country among
villeins; they must never exact unjust tolls…all usurers must renounce usury.”162
Such demands were especially onerous on the mercantile economy of Languedoc and
nearly impossible to fulfill. After all, many nobles resided in town so that they could benefit
from the region’s rich trade, and there was not a secular ruler in Europe that accepted the
supreme authority of the clergy willingly.163 Peter sympathized with Raymond’s plight and
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argued that the demands “must be changed!”164 The agreement was rejected, and the next day,
the legates excommunicated Raymond once again.165
For the pope, the most important consideration during the crusade was whether or not it
was fought justly. He wanted above all to nullify the threat of heresy, preferably through
conversion rather than force. In justifying the crusade, Innocent relied heavily on the
interpretations of the Paris masters.166 Heretics were legitimate targets of military action because
they threatened the physical existence of the Catholic Church, in the same way that the Saracens
in the east threatened Christendom. However, there was debate on the extent clergymen could
get involved in condemning the murder of the Church’s enemies. Similarly, war was justified
only if the crusaders themselves had pure motives.167 In pursuing this aim of a just war, Innocent
was sensitive to criticisms of greed, especially after the troubles of the Fourth Crusade, and he
was more than willing to pursue reconciliation with local leaders such as Raymond VI and
Raymond-Roger.168
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When Peter II accused the crusade of taking the lands of loyal Catholics, Innocent took
his word for it and ended the crusade indulgence on Peter’s advice.169 In 1213, Innocent
reprimanded Arnold Amalric and Simon de Montfort for they had “led the crusaders into the
territories of the Count of Toulouse and have thus not only occupied places inhabited by heretics
but have equally extended greedy hands into lands which had no ill reputation for heresy.”170
Innocent willingly listened to Peter because he had proven throughout his reign that he was a
pious king. He had been crowned by Innocent, and it had enhanced his position as a Christian
monarch, and Innocent felt that the Church had “especially taken care to honour you [Peter], and
on account of this you have accrued both power and fame.”171
Peter II was in no way sympathetic to heresy; he had implemented the death penalty for
heretics in his lands, and he had sworn to continue his persecution of heresy when he was
crowned by the pope.172 He had even drawn attention to the problem when he sent a letter to the
pope complaining “how heretical they were” in Carcassonne.173 His opposition to the crusade did
not stem from disapproval of the crusade’s aims but rather from how it was carried out and the
threat it posed to his own political authority.
At the Battle of Las Navas in 1212, Peter led a resounding victory against his Muslim
enemies, granting him great moral authority. It was only after this victory that Peter seriously
began to petition the pope to end the Albigensian Crusade, and the pope was willing to listen
because of the reputation Peter gained from his success against the Muslims.174
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The legates were outraged when they learned Innocent had ended the indulgence. They
immediately sent a delegation to Innocent who, convinced of their argument, “declared his
response to the King’s envoys invalid.”175 He reprimanded Peter for practicing “impiety under
the appearance of piety” and warned him to “not dispense, through yourself or others, advice,
help or favour to them [Toulouse].”176 Despite the crusaders’ flouting of papal mandates, the
papacy still relied on and trusted the reports of his legates. When made aware of the reasons
behind the crusaders’ actions, Innocent usually sided with them. However, Innocent would
continue to try and resolve the differences between the two sides of the crusade. In the same
letter that he reprimanded Peter for acting impiously, he also urged him to work with Simon to
destroy heresy.177

The way in which the pope and his legates resolved their conflicts can most clearly be
seen in the Anonymous Successor’s account of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. Raymond
VI, Raymond VII, the Count of Comminges, and the Count of Foix travelled to Rome to petition
the pope for their lands back. Innocent was ready to do so, lamenting that “bitter accusations
reach me each month,” and that his legates “ought to be giving alms, not taking them.”178 But his
legates advised him against it, asking “how can you thus covertly disinherit the count de
Montfort, a truly obedient son of holy Church?”179 In the end, after much debate, Innocent
affirmed Simon’s possession of the fief, but he ordered that the count of Foix’s castle “should be
given back to him,” and forbid the crusaders from making war on either the Count of
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Comminges or the Count of Foix.180 He also absolved Raymond VII of any blame and ensured
that he would retain Provence, while his father was sent into exile and lost all of his lands.181 As
much as Innocent wanted to reform the Languedocian nobility to the Church, he accepted his
legates’ complaints against Raymond as legitimate and understood the need to reward Simon,
“who had struggled courageously and faithfully above all others in the fight for the faith.”182
Even if accepted complaints brought against the crusaders, he still trusted the judgement of his
legates above all else.
VIII. Resistance and Control: Maintaining Authority
Resistance to the crusade began to consolidate in 1213 around Peter of Aragon. In 1212,
Peter successfully defeated the Almohads in Spain and turned his full attention to Languedoc. As
his father before him, Peter’s policy was to ensure the safety of his vassals and check the power
of the Capetians in the area.
Peter’s relationship with Simon dissolved in the face of Peter’s mounting hostility toward
the crusade. Even though Peter had accepted Simon de Montfort as his vassal, Simon’s loyalty to
the French Crown was problematic, especially after Simon de Montfort proved unhelpful to
Peter’s fight against the Almohads, and Peter repudiated Simon in 1213.183 Peter of les Vaux-deCernay accused Peter II of being unfair and claimed that Simon had “never failed to carry out his
obligations to the king.” 184 This was not strictly true, as Guy de Lucy had left Spain at a critical
moment in order to assist the Albigensian Crusade at Simon’s request, which had deeply angered
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the king.185 Around the same time as Peter sent his missives to the pope asking for an end to the
crusade, he also accepted the count of Toulouse as a vassal. Toulouse had traditionally been
“part of the domains of the king of France,”186 and in taking Toulouse under his protection, Peter
expanded his own power at the expense of the Crown of Aragon’s longtime enemies.187 While it
was not unusual for someone to swear fealty to more than one lord, the oaths of allegiance sworn
by the count of Toulouse effectively transferred his lands and loyalty to the Crown of Aragon.188
Unfortunately, Peter’s resistance would be short-lived. In September 1213, Peter arrived
before Muret, intending to face Simon de Montfort in open battle. Raymond VI advised the king
to “plant barricades round the tents so that no cavalry can get through; then if the French try to
attack, first we use crossbows to wound them and then as they swerve aside, we make our charge
and rout them all.”189 However, Peter rejected this advice as cowardly. Instead, Peter opted to
lead a charge across the marshes, taking a position in the second row, a highly unusual and
dangerous move for a king in medieval warfare.190 It would prove to be a grave mistake. The
army charged in a disorderly manner, “paying heed to neither count nor king,” and Peter was
“struck and so severely wounded that his blood spilled out on the ground and he fell his full
length dead.”191 The battle quickly turned into a rout as Peter’s men panicked and fled, and the
crusaders “set upon the hindmost and slew many thousands of them.”192 Peter’s death ended
dreams of Aragon-Catalonian expansion in the Midi, and the people of Languedoc would not
mount another major rebellion until 1216, when Raymond VII was able to build a significant
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coalition against Simon de Montfort. This second phase of rebellion would last much longer and
would not be resolved until after the death of the chief crusader in 1218.193
The crusade did have some support among the local population, primarily among
disaffected lords and the merchant class. Count Baldwin, Raymond VI’s brother, sided with the
crusaders because he “did not want to be under his brother’s control” and “anything he should
conquer with them should be entirely his own.”194 When Baldwin first came to Toulouse in 1194
after growing up in France, Raymond refused to accept him until he “obtained the letters and
seals from the prelates and barons who knew of his birth.”195 Raymond remained resistant to
Baldwin, and even when Baldwin fought against the lords of Baux on his behalf, he “did not
reward him by assigning any territory to him.”196 The crusade offered Baldwin a chance to stake
a claim in the region, and he remained a loyal supporter until his death in 1214. The merchant
class also offered support to Simon. Simon alleviated his reliance on local lords by turning to the
burghers and granting them significant economic boons in exchange for their support, such as
exemptions from tolls and customs.197
But for the most part, the crusaders struggled to foster and maintain support among the
local nobility. Languedocian nobles were primarily interested in pursuing their own political
autonomy and tended to support whichever side promised the most political gain.198 Afraid of
approaching crusaders, castra would often surrender, only to rebel after Simon de Montfort
moved on. In late 1209, both Castres and Lombres deserted the crusade.199 Early in 1212, both
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Rabastens and Puylaurens had “sworn oaths and broken them.”200 In late 1213, “many knights in
the Count’s territory now seceded from God, the Church and our Count” while Simon was
occupied in Provence.201 Early the next year, Narbonne broke from the count “because they
believed no more crusaders would come.”202 Aimeric, lord of Montréal, also “deserted God and
the Count.”203 The lord of Cabaret, Peter-Roger, “an old man rich in years of evil-doing,”204
resisted the crusaders and the lordship of Simon, much as he had resisted the lordship of the
Trencavels. His goal was always to maintain his own independence, and he was representative of
the kinds of opposition Simon would face.205
These broken alliances were met with quick and violent retribution. The nobles who
defected did not necessarily see their actions as betrayal, as it was a common cultural practice in
the region, but Simon de Montfort envisioned his rule in the context of northern French customs,
which saw the actions of these lords as the worst sort of treachery.206 William of Tudela reported
that after several castra reneged, Simon reconquered the area with force, and “in Touelles, which
surrendered to him, he killed every wretch that he could find there.”207 At Lavaur in 1211,
Simon de Montfort had the defenders put to the sword, “the Dame of Lavaur, sister of Aimeric
and a heretic of the worst sort, thrown into a pit and stones heaped upon her,” and “innumerable
heretics” burnt.208 This was the first time during the crusade in which the crusaders did not
attempt to convert the heretics before burning them, and the massacre at Lavaur was
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comparatively large to other sieges during the crusade.209 This was a result of the dangerous
opposition Lavaur presented to the crusade, and the fact that they openly harbored the traitor
Aimeric of Montréal.
Violent punishment was used against all traitors, whether they were Languedocian or
French. When a French clerk betrayed Montréal to the enemy, Simon had him “dragged by a
horse through the city of Carcassonne and hanged.”210 A Frenchman who killed Giraud de
Pépieux’s uncle was “thrown into a pit and buried alive,”211 even though the Frenchman was of
high rank, which usually alleviated the type of punishment inflicted.
Punishment was also used against those who refused to surrender in the first place. In
September 1212, Simon demanded that Moissac hand over the mercenaries or “he would not let
one of them escape alive.”212 At the beginning of the crusade, “all agreed that every castle the
army approached, a garrison that refused to surrender should be slaughtered wholesale, once the
castle had been taken by storm. They would then meet with no resistance anywhere.”213 The
need to reduce the amount of resistance was important as Simon’s military support became rather
limited after 1209, and he did not have the resources to face unified resistance.214
The crusaders were not the only ones to violently punish their enemies. In 1211, the
Count of Foix and his men “clubbed [crusaders] to death.”215 Giraud de Pépieux, who defected
after the death of his uncle, captured a contingent of crusaders and “put out their eyes; more than
that, he cut off their ears and noses and upper lips and sent them off naked to find their way back
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to the Count.”216 Baldwin, Raymond’s brother, was betrayed by the lord of Lolmie and “hanged
from a walnut tree.”217 When the crusade’s opponents retook Castelnaudary in autumn 1211,
they killed many of the crusaders stationed in the surrounding garrisons.218 Near Carcassonne in
1212 the son of Raymond-Roger, Roger-Bernard, and a contingent of mercenaries killed
crusaders “and tore them limb from limb, the rest they took to Foix. Here they kept them in
chains and tore them to pieces with the most monstrous tortures.”219
Such actions were not unusual in medieval warfare. The perceived brutality of the war
comes from the fact that it lasted nearly twenty years and subjected the area to sustained warfare
based around sieging and raiding that was more intense than Languedoc was used to.220 While
warfare had been endemic to the region for over a century, it had always been focused on the
relatively small power struggles of the local nobility within the same cultural context, while the
Albigensian Crusade introduced large armies under foreign leaders intent on changing a
significant part of Languedocian society. For Simon and his crusaders, violence was essential to
maintaining their authority; the ability to back up claims to authority with military success was a
key component of legitimizing authority across Europe during this period. The difference for
Simon de Montfort lay in the fact that his actions were “justified by canon law rather than feudal
practice.”221
The generally brutal nature of medieval warfare is reflected in the way the chroniclers
discussed violence. Violence was always justified for whichever side the chronicler supported,
despite both the crusaders and their opponents doing many of the same things. For Peter of les
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Vaux-de-Cernay, a staunch supporter of the crusade, the actions of the crusaders were always
valid. In 1210, when the crusaders “put out the eyes of the defenders, over a hundred in number,
and cut off their noses,”222 Peter made sure to emphasize that this was a necessary response to
the previous transgressions of the crusade’s opponents and not out of a “delight in cruelty”223
even though when Giraud de Pépieux did the same to the crusaders it was “a wicked crime,
unheard of cruelty!”224 The Anonymous Successor of Tudela did not support the crusade, and as
such, excused the actions of those that opposed the crusade. When the locals attacked the
crusaders in 1218, “they hacked and dismembered them, so that feet and fists…littered the
battlefield and encrusted the reddened ground.”225 Tudela’s Successor described such actions as
only “a scene of war,”226 while Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay described the same actions as brutal and
as “acts of madness.”227

The need to violently suppress dissention partially arose from the limited military support
Simon de Montfort had. Despite the large turnout of crusaders at the beginning of the campaign,
they quickly dispersed once they earned their indulgence. The proximity of Languedoc to their
homelands made their obligations to the crusade short-lived.228 After the first campaign ended in
1209, the “great host broke up, for it could hold together no longer.”229 Both the nobility and
common men departed at an alarmingly frequent rate, and in 1210, a forty-days minimum service
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was instituted to earn the indulgence.230 Despite this, men would leave as soon as their forty
days’ were up, even if it meant leaving in the middle of a siege. In 1211, Simon was forced to lift
the siege on Toulouse “when the crusaders had completed their forty days service.”231 In 1213,
men left during a siege in Albi; “left almost alone, Guy [de Montfort] was compelled to abandon
the siege.”232
Simon’s strongest support came from his immediate family and vassals. Simon could not
call on the support of his extended family, however. They were mostly men of equal or greater
rank with close ties to the Capetian monarchy. The king offered them better chances of
advancement; Simon, on the other hand, lay outside the sphere of royal government, even though
he served in the royal court for several years. As a result, Simon’s staunchest supporters
throughout the crusade remained his immediate family and men who had close geographical ties
to him or were his social inferiors. For example, both Robert Mauvoisin and Simon of Neauphle
came from lands bordering the Montfort fiefs in France. Both stayed in the Midi well beyond the
minimum service, and Robert served as an important administrator during the crusade.233
Throughout the crusade, Simon relied on the support of his brother and son. Guy de
Montfort joined his brother in December 1211 after returning from the crusader states, where he
had served as lord of Sidon.234 In 1212, Guy subdued the territories of the Count of Foix while
Simon besieged Penne. After he had “completely destroyed numerous strong castra” he returned
to Penne to assist his brother as other crusaders departed after completing their forty days’
service.235 Simon would take a similar tactic at the siege of Moissac, where the brothers worked
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together before Simon sent Guy to capture more fortresses.236 Simon trusted his brother to
expand and maintain the crusaders’ military authority over the region, and Guy was one of the
few who stayed throughout the duration of the crusade.237 In return, Simon granted Guy the fief
of Rabastens in 1213.238 In 1215, Simon sent his brother as his envoy to the Fourth Lateran
Council to stop those “obstructing the business of the faith by working for the restoration of the
Counts of Toulouse and Foix to their former position.”239 Guy not only helped Simon obtain new
territory but also represented him and helped maintain those claims. Simon’s son played a
similar role; in 1213, “Amaury with his small force applied himself vigorously to attacking and
capturing castra in Gascony.”240 The following year Simon left Amaury in charge of the siege of
Casseneuil, and he played a leading role, along with Guy de Montfort, in the struggle over
Beaucaire.241 In 1217, Simon “left another large force…under the command of his son
Amaury.”242
Simon’s wife, Alice Montmorency, also provided considerable assistance during the
crusade. She played an important role in raising troops for the crusade; in 1210, she travelled to
the Midi “accompanied by numerous knights.”243 This support was essential to Simon’s ability to
go on the offensive, and it was not the only time she led troops from France into Languedoc.244
She was especially important in securing the financial support of her family, the powerful
Montmorency clan, although Simon still struggled to raise enough funds.245 She also played an
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important negotiating role with departing crusaders. In 1213, she “begged them passionately not
to turn their backs on the Lord’s business,”246 and managed to convince the bishop of Chartres to
remain with his troops. By 1217, she was acting as castellan of Toulouse while her husband
campaigned elsewhere.247 In a region where alliances shifted overnight, the support of Simon’s
family was crucial to securing stability and maintaining authority. In 1211, Simon de Montfort
suffered when “his Countess was at Lavaur; their eldest son, Amaury, was ill at Fanjeaux; a
daughter, born in the area, was being nursed in Montréal. None of them could see each other or
give each other any support.”248 Languedoc would never provide Simon the political support he
needed, so he turned to his personal networks instead.
IX. Conclusion
Simon de Montfort died in 1218 while attempting to take Toulouse. He was succeeded by
his son, Amaury, who proved to be a much less effective ruler than his father, although the
papacy continued to support his claims until Amaury ceded them to the French king in 1219.249
Pope Honorius III would take a more active role than his predecessor in the second half of the
Albigensian Crusade, but he became increasingly disillusioned with the ability of military force
to deal with the threat of heresy. It is in Honorius’ reign that we begin to see the beginning of the
Inquisition process that would eventually replace the crusade after 1229.250 Honorius emphasized
the need for French involvement in the region, and finally, after many years of trying, persuaded
the French King, now Louis VIII, to take military action in the region in 1226.251 In 1229,
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Raymond VII finally capitulated and formally surrendered to the French government; he would
retain his lands, like most lords in the region.252 For the most part, life continued on in
Languedoc as it had always done after the end of the crusade; the region would not consider
itself as French until well in the nineteenth century, despite being more firmly under French
political control, and it would maintain strong cultural ties to Catalonia until the French
Revolution.253 Yet the crusade subjugated the region to French authority, and this allowed the
Inquisition to take place as religious leaders worked with the backing of secular authorities to
eradicate heresy from the land.
The crusade reveals how the lack of strong political support in Languedoc resulted in a
violent war that sought to suppress both religious and political dissent. The need to punish the
crusade’s opponents arose not from religious conviction but from weak political strength. For the
crusade’s opponents, the war was an act of aggression on the part of the French, but the legates
and crusaders themselves identified strongly with the religious motivations behind the crusade.
The relationship between religious ideology and political ambition was complex, and the
different cultural perspectives of the crusaders and Languedocians further complicated matters.
The resulting war was not significantly more violent or barbaric than any other medieval war, but
it was horrific nonetheless.
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Appendix A: Maps of Languedoc
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Appendix B: Important People
❖ Simon de Montfort (1165?-1218)
o Secular leader of the crusade. While he made significant political gains during the
crusade, he also believed in the religious goals of the crusade. He had particularly
close ties to the Cistercians, unlike the local nobility, making him particularly
popular with the papacy. He came from northern France.
❖ Raymond VI of St. Gilles (1156-1222)
o Count of Toulouse. He suffered from poor relations with the papacy. He was an
ineffective political leader for the most part, and he was never able to establish a
loyal base around himself.
❖ Raymond VII of St. Gilles (1197-1249)
o A more charismatic leader than his father, Raymond began to play a prominent
role in 1216 when he was eighteen. He would eventually surrender in 1229 to the
French monarchy, tired of war.
❖ Innocent III (r. 1198-1216)
o Considered one of the most political popes, he would call three crusades,
including the Albigensian. Despite this, he honestly believed that heresy
threatened the very existence of Christianity and thought the crusade was the only
way to solve the problem. However, during the crusade he would prove indecisive
in how he dealt with complaints against the crusaders.
❖ Arnold Amalric (d. 1225)
o Cistercian abbot and papal legate during the crusade. Probably one of the most
politically motivated of the clergymen active in the region, he also claimed the
dukedom of Narbonne after being named archbishop in 1212. He played an
important leadership role in the Crusade until about 1212.
❖ Raymond-Roger, Count of Foix (d. 1223)
o One of the most skilled military commanders during the Albigensian Crusade.
However, Simon de Montfort antagonized him on multiple occasions, turning him
into an implacable enemy. While he was not accused of heresy himself, his sister
and wife were known heretics.
❖ Raymond-Roger Trencavel (d. 1209)
o The young viscount of Carcassonne and Béziers. He was captured and
imprisoned, where he died. He most likely died from illness, but some accused
Simon de Montfort of having him purposely killed.
❖ Philip Augustus (1165-1223)
o King of France during the Albigensian Crusade. He remained lukewarm to the
endeavor as he was involved in a war with both England and the Holy Roman
Empire during the beginning of the crusade, and he did not see the region as
worth the investment.
❖ Peter II ‘The Catholic’ of Aragon (1178-1213)
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❖

❖
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❖
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❖

o King of Aragon-Catalonia. He opposed the crusade, despite his hatred of heresy.
Like many southerners, he viewed the crusade in political terms rather than
religious. He died in 1213 at the Battle of Muret.
John I of England (1166-1216)
o His involvement in the crusade was minimal, but he was viewed with mistrust by
the crusaders because his sister had married Raymond VI. However, he was more
concerned with his war against Philip Augustus, and he was excommunicated by
the Church, so he did not offer much support to Toulouse
Honorius III (r. 1216-1227)
o While he was primarily focused on the fifth crusade, Honorius did institute a
fairly hefty tax to fund the Albigensian Crusade. He did provide more support
than Innocent, and he was successful in getting the French monarchy involved in
the crusade. He also saw that crusade was not going to solve the problem of
heresy and began the processes that would lead to the Inquisition.
Fulk of Marseilles, Bishop of Toulouse (1150-1231)
o An ardent supporter of the crusade, he actively sought to convert heretics and
foster support for the crusade in Toulouse. His success was limited. He had been a
troubadour before the crusade, but had joined the Cistercian Order in 1195.
St. Dominic of Guzman (1170-1221)
o Interested in reform, he established the Dominican Order so that he could better
combat heresy in Languedoc. Along with Diego, the Bishop of Osma, he was
responsible for reforming how the legates preached in Languedoc in the early
1200s. He also established a religious house for reformed female heretics.
Amaury de Montfort (1195-1241)
o Simon de Montfort’s son. He would provide valuable military support during the
crusade and replaced his father after he was killed in 1218.
Alice Montmorency (d. 1220/1)
o Simon de Montfort’s wife. She would prove to be valuable in recruiting crusaders
and securing the financial support of her family. She also provided political
support for her husband by serving as the castellan of Toulouse while Simon
campaigned.
Peter of les Vaux-de-Cernay
o A chronicler who ardently supported the crusade. He was present at many of the
events he described. He was particularly fond of Simon de Montfort. His
chronicle ends rather abruptly in 1218, soon after Simon’s death, possibly as a
result of his own death. Fond of miracles and hyperbole.
William of Tudela (~1199-1214)
o Another contemporary chronicler, he was more critical of the crusade’s aims and
he represents a Languedocian view. His chronicle was continued by an
anonymous chronicler, who was much more critical of the crusade and viewed the
crusaders as greedy land-grabbers.
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